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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Abdul Kariem Muhammud pleaded guilty pursuant to a 
written plea agreement in which he waived his right to appeal 
or collaterally attack the judgment of conviction.  
Nevertheless, more than two years after he was sentenced, 
Muhammud filed a notice of appeal.  The government, 
mistakenly believing that he was appealing the denial of his § 
2255 petition, moved to enforce the waiver but failed to assert 
the untimeliness of what was an appeal from the judgment of 
conviction.  We are presented with the following questions: 
(1) whether the government can initially raise untimeliness in 
its merits brief to us, or must do so beforehand by motion; (2) 
whether a court can raise untimeliness sua sponte when the 
government has failed to do so; and (3) whether, if the appeal 
is not dismissed as untimely, Muhammud has waived his right 
to appeal.  Because the government properly raised 
untimeliness in its merits brief, we will dismiss the appeal and 
do not reach the other questions presented.   
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Muhammud was charged in a superseding indictment 
 3 
with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On June 12, 
2007, he pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a 
written plea agreement that contained a waiver both of appeal 
and collateral attack of his conviction.
1
  At the plea hearing, 
he acknowledged the waiver, and responded to the District 
Court’s questions regarding the waiver.  He was subsequently 
sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment, as stipulated in the 
plea agreement, and acknowledged at sentencing that his 
appellate rights were limited by the plea agreement.  He did 
not file a notice of appeal within ten days of entry of the final 
judgment on June 27, 2008, as then required by Rule 
4(b)(1)(A)(i).   
 
 Almost a year later, Muhammud filed a pro se motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting several bases of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  He argued that his petition should be 
heard, despite the waiver, because his guilty plea had been 
coerced by his attorney and entered under duress.  On August 
19, 2009, the District Court granted the government’s motion 
to enforce the waiver and dismiss the petition after concluding 
that Muhammud had knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to collaterally attack his conviction and that upholding 
the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.  On 
September 22, 2009, Muhammud filed, pro se, a notice of 
appeal with respect to the order dismissing the § 2255 
petition.  We remanded the matter to the District Court to 
determine whether a certificate of appealability (“COA”) 
should issue.  The District Court denied a COA.  We then 
denied Muhammud’s application to us for a COA, finding that 
jurists of reason would not debate the District Court’s 
conclusion that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to collaterally attack his conviction.   
 
 On June 11, 2010, Muhammud filed a notice of appeal 
                                                 
1
 The waiver contains limited exceptions not applicable 
here. 
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from his judgment of conviction of two years earlier.  The 
following month, the government moved to enforce the 
appellate waiver and for summary affirmance,
2
 and the Clerk 
of the Court advised the parties of the timeliness issue.  A 
motions panel referred the government’s motion to the merits 
panel and directed that the parties also brief whether we may 
raise sua sponte the timeliness requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 
4(b), an issue left open in Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. 
Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
government now challenges this appeal as untimely and, 
failing that, as waived.   
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 The time limit for filing a criminal appeal set forth in 
Rule 4(b) is rigid but not jurisdictional, and may be waived if 
not invoked by the government. Martinez, 620 F.3d at 328-29; 
see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007).  An 
untimely appeal must be dismissed, however, if the 
government objects. Martinez, 620 F.3d at 328-29.   
 
 Although we have not directly considered the issue, 
other courts of appeals have allowed the government to object 
to timeliness at any point up to and including in its merits 
brief.  See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 623 F.3d 542, 548 
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1313 
(11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287, 1292 
n.7 (10th Cir. 2007).  We agree with that conclusion.  Because 
the government invokes Rule 4(b) in its brief, we must—and 
will—dismiss this concededly untimely appeal.3   
                                                 
2
 The government maintains that it did not move to 
dismiss the appeal as untimely because it mistakenly believed 
Muhammud was again attempting to appeal the order 
dismissing his § 2255 petition.   
 
3
 Although, given this conclusion, we need not reach 
the remaining questions, we note that, albeit in dicta, we have 
also agreed with other courts of appeals that a court may sua 
sponte raise untimeliness under Rule 4, see Long v. Atlantic 
City Police Dep't, 670 F.3d 436, 445 n.18 (3d Cir. 2012); 
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 One final note.  Although an objection to timeliness 
can be raised by the government in its brief, the government is 
strongly encouraged to file a motion to dismiss a criminal 
appeal as untimely at the outset of an appeal before the filing 
of the appellant’s brief.  Early identification of untimely 
criminal appeals saves both the government and CJA counsel 
the time and the costs associated with unnecessary transcript 
preparation, motions for extensions of time, and the 
preparation of and filing of full briefs.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 We will dismiss the appeal as untimely.   
 
                                                                                                             
United States v. Gaytan-Garza, 652 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 
2011) (dismissing four-year old appeal sua sponte); United 
States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750-51 (10th Cir. 2008), and 
have already found, in the context of his collateral attack, that 
the waiver Muhammud acknowledged was knowing and 
voluntary.  Enforcing that waiver would not work a 
miscarriage of justice. United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 
529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008).   
